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Abstract 
 
Background: The amygdala is an anatomically complex medial temporal brain structure 
whose subregions are considered to serve distinct functions. However, their precise role in 
mediating human aversive experience remains ill understood. 
 
Methods: We used functional MRI in 39 healthy volunteers with varying levels of trait 
anxiety to assess distinct contributions of the basolateral (BLA) and centromedial amygdala 
(CMA) to anticipation and experience of aversive events. Additionally, we examined the 
relationship between any identified functional subspecialisation and measures of subjective 
reported aversion and trait anxiety. 
 
Results: Our results show that the CMA is responsive to aversive outcomes, but insensitive 
to predictive aversive cues. In contrast, the BLA encodes an aversive prediction error that 
quantifies whether cues and outcomes are worse than expected. A neural representation 
within the BLA for distinct threat levels was mirrored in self-reported subjective anxiety 
across individuals. Furthermore, trait-anxious individuals were characterised by 
indiscriminately heightened BLA activity in response to aversive cues, irrespective of actual 
threat level. 
 
Conclusions: Our results demonstrate that amygdala subregions are distinctly engaged in 
processing of aversive experience, with elevated and undifferentiated BLA responses to 
threat emerging as a potential neurobiological mediator of vulnerability to anxiety disorders. 
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Introduction 
Fear and anxiety are adaptive responses to demands of everyday life, such as 
environmental threat. When these aversive responses are exaggerated, they may lead to a 
range of anxiety disorders (1). However, it remains unclear why human subjects differ so 
strikingly in their subjective response to objectively similar threats, and in turn in the 
expression of anxiety traits (2). 
The amygdala is a key structure for processing aversive experience and negative 
emotional information (3, 4). Previous research has highlighted its relevance for threat 
processing, ascribing to it a role in the genesis of disorders that encompass the anxiety 
spectrum (5, 6). The amygdala is anatomically heterogeneous, with distinct subregions 
assumed to serve different functional roles (7). At least two major functional subregions can 
be identified, the basolateral (BLA) and centromedial (CMA) amygdala (8, 9). 
Despite substantial evidence derived from non-human animal experiments (10) and 
human anatomical studies (11, 12), little is known regarding a functional subspecialisation 
within human amygdala nuclei (13). Recent neuroimaging studies suggest that CMA and 
BLA might have distinct functional roles in humans, primarily in the context of associative 
learning (14, 15), threat prioritisation (16), and social functioning (17, 18). 
However, how human amygdala subregions process aversive events, and how 
expectations about these events modulate these functions, remains unknown.  Moreover, due 
to the fact that subjective experience cannot be assessed in non-human animal models, it 
remains elusive how amygdala subregions mediate a transformation from objective threat to 
subjective aversion. Thus, the goal of our study was two-fold: Firstly, we combined 
functional MRI with a novel Pavlovian conditioning paradigm to probe the exact roles of 
BLA and CMA in threat processing, i.e., aversive expectation. Secondly, we assessed how 
 4
both interindividual and trial-by-trial variability in aversive signals in the amygdala relate to 
both subjective and trait anxiety. Given its substantial sensory afferent information and 
implication in threat processing in non-human animals, we hypothesized BLA, but not CMA, 
to encode threat expectations (19, 20). Moreover, we conjectured such a neural signature of 
threat within BLA to be related to interindividual differences in anxiety traits (21). 
Ultimately, due its role as the major amygdala output centre and in the generation of 
responses to acute stressors such as pain (22-24), we assumed CMA activity in response to 
aversive events to be reflected in subjective reports of aversion. 
 
Methods and Materials 
 
Participants 
 42 healthy, right-handed volunteers (screened for neurological and psychiatric 
conditions, including anxiety disorders and phobias) participated in this experiment and 
received monetary compensation for their time (£30-£40). Participants were recruited along 
usual guidelines from an online subject pool at University College London (UCL), but not 
through courses or lectures given by the authors. Data from three subjects were excluded due 
to equipment failure involving electrical stimulation during scanning, leaving 39 participants 
for all subsequent behavioural and neural analyses (mean age: 25.0; range 18-39 years; 22 
females). The experimental protocol was approved by UCL research ethics committee, 
informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
 
Trait anxiety 
To measure trait anxiety, subjects filled out the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) trait subscale after the scan, a self-report questionnaire of high internal 
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consistency (Cronbach's alpha in present sample: α=0.92) that is commonly used to measure 
anxiety in clinical and non-clinical samples (25, 26). The score ranges between 20 and 80, 
with higher scores indicating greater trait anxiety. 
 
Experimental task 
We aimed to characterise how participants anticipate and process aversive events 
(painful electric shocks to the hand), and how neural signals in response to threat relate to 
subjective experience and trait anxiety. To this end, we designed a novel task consisting of 
180 trials, divided into four blocks of 45 trials each.  
On each trial, subjects were presented with a picture of an insect, either a mosquito or 
a bug, shown next to the back of an image of a hand for 4000ms. Each insect signalled a 
specific probability of receiving an electrical shock, with one insect (high probability cue, 90 
trials) followed by a shock on 70% of trials (63 shocks) and by no shock 30% of trials, and 
the other insect (low probability cue, 90 trials) followed by a shock on 30% (27 shocks), and 
no shock on 70% of trials (insects were counterbalanced across subjects). Note that cues were 
perfectly matched with respect to their uncertainty (absolute deviation from probability of 
shock equal to 50%), differing solely in objective predictiveness of shock receipt. 
To avoid any influence arising out of learning, subjects were familiarised with shock 
probability attributed to each stimulus in a pre-scanning training and explicitly informed that 
probabilities remained fixed throughout the entirety of training and experiment. Outcome 
onset was indicated by appearance of a red dot (duration: 1500ms), either displayed next to 
the hand (indicating no shock) or superimposed on the hand (indicating shock, shock 
duration: 100ms). If the red dot was displayed on the hand, shocks were applied simultaneous 
in time to its appearance.  
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 After a jittered fixation cross (mean: 3000ms; uniformly distributed between 1500-
4500ms), subjects were asked to rate their anticipatory anxiety using a slider (“How anxious 
did you feel while the insect was present?”). Importantly, subjects were instructed and 
previously trained to recall the subjective state/feelings elicited by predictive cue 
presentation, ignoring the actual outcome of each trial. Ratings were given without time 
restrictions by moving a cursor (always starting at the midpoint) along a scale that spanned 
“not anxious” on the extreme left through to “very anxious” on the extreme right. After 
another jittered fixation (mean: 3000ms; range: 2000–4000ms), the appearance of hand and 
insect indicated beginning of the next trial. 
 On average, one block lasted 11min, with minor variation between subjects depending 
on times for self-paced anxiety ratings. Between blocks, subjects were allowed a break, and 
we repeated a short pain titration procedure (see below for details). Overall, the task in the 
scanner lasted on average 55min. 
 
Electrical stimulation 
 Participants underwent an individually tailored pain titration procedure (27, 28) with a 
Digitimer DS7a electric stimulator (Welwyn Garden City, UK) that can produce stimulator 
output as high as 100mA. An electrode was placed on the back of the subject’s left hand and 
titration began with a low-current electric shock (0.1 mA), where subjects were asked to rate 
its painfulness on a visual 21-point scale (ranging from 0=‘not unpleasant’ to 5=‘quite 
unpleasant’ to 10=‘extremely unpleasant and unbearable’). For each subsequent shock, 
intensity was increased in small increments with subject’s approval. This procedure was 
repeated until subjective ratings of pain reached 7 (‘very unpleasant but bearable’). This 
intensity was used for the first block of the experiment. To avoid excessive habituation to 
stimulation, and excessive pain due to increased shock sensitivity over the course of the 
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experiment, a short titration procedure was repeated within the scanner before each of the 
four experimental blocks. Hence, perceived subjective experience was kept constant 
throughout the experiment. Mean shock intensity across subjects was 2.3mA ± 1.3 (range 
0.5-6.7), and there was no relationship between chosen intensity and trait anxiety (r=-0.094, 
p=0.569). 
  
Pre-scanning training 
 Subjects performed two practice blocks (20 trials each) outside the scanner. This 
ensured they had learned the two levels of shock probability and familiarized themselves with 
the task structure. Importantly, subjects were informed beforehand that one of the insects 
would be associated with a high and the other with a low chance of predicting an upcoming 
shock. 
Whilst the first block familiarized subjects with stimuli and associated shock 
probabilities, i.e., without provision of subjective ratings, the second block was the same as in 
the scanner, including subjective ratings. Analysis of the second training block indicated that 
subjects had learned to dissociate the two threat stimuli before entering the scanner, as 
indicated by a strong difference in anxiety ratings for high versus low threat stimuli 
(Supplementary Fig. 1). 
 
fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing 
 T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) MRI data was acquired using a Siemens 
Trio 3T scanner, using a 32-channel head coil. We collected whole-brain data, 42 slices with 
3mm isotropic voxels; repetition time (TR): 2.94s; echo time (TE): 30ms; slice tilt: −30° 
(T>C) relative to scanner axis; Z-shim -0.4. This sequence is designed for optimal sensitivity 
and reduced susceptibility-induced signal dropout particularly in temporal regions such as 
 8
amygdala (29). To account for T1-saturation effects, the first six volumes of each session 
were discarded. Additionally, whole-brain field maps (3mm isotropic, 10ms/12.46ms TE for 
short/long respectively, 37ms total EPI readout time, phase-encode blip polarity −1) were 
acquired to correct EPIs for field strength inhomogeneity. All fMRI analyses were performed 
using default settings within SPM12 (Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging; 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). EPIs were realigned and unwarped using the field maps, subsequently 
co-registered to subject-specific anatomical images and normalised to MNI-space, using the 
1.5mm MNI152 atlas implemented in SPM12. Finally, normalized EPIs were smoothed with 
a 6mm FWHM-kernel to satisfy smoothness assumptions of statistical correction algorithms. 
To ascertain these results were robust, we conducted additional analyses using reduced 
smoothing kernels (4.5mm, 3mm), which yielded similar results (Supplementary Table 1). 
 
Structural MRI data acquisition 
 Structural images were acquired using quantitative multiparameter maps (MPMs) in a 
3D multi-echo fast-low angle shot (FLASH) sequence with 1-mm isotropic resolution (30). 
Three different FLASH datasets were acquired: predominantly MT weighting (TR/α = 
23.7ms/6°; excitation preceded by an off-resonance Gaussian MT pulse of 4ms duration, 
220° nominal flip angle, 2 kHz frequency offset), proton density weighting (PD; = 
23.7ms/6°), and T1 weighting (18.7ms/20°). To increase signal-to-noise ratio, signals of six 
equidistant bipolar gradient echoes (echo time 2.2-14.7ms) were averaged. Semiquantitative 
MT maps were calculated using mean signal amplitude and T1 maps (31), additionally 
eliminating influence of B1 inhomogeneity and relaxation effects (32). 
 
Behavioural analysis 
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 To assess what influenced subjects’ anxiety ratings, we ran an ANOVA with factors 
‘expectation’ (high/low) and ‘outcome’ (shock/no shock). 
 Additionally, we fitted a trial-by-trial linear regression model. To predict anxiety 
ratings on current trial T, we used (i) probability (high vs. low), (ii) outcome type (shock vs. 
no shock), and (iii) interaction term, (iv) elapsed time between outcome offset and rating 
onset, (v) rating time (from ratings onset to offset), whilst also testing for influence of (iv & 
v) outcome type of previous trials, i.e., trial T-1 and T-2. 
 Behavioural analyses were conducted in Matlab (version 2016, The MathWorks) and 
SPSS (version 25, IBM). 
 
fMRI analysis 
 The main goal of our fMRI analysis was to characterise how different amygdala 
subregions respond to aversive states, i.e., anticipation and experience of negative outcomes. 
In a General Linear Model (GLM), we entered two different regressors at time of cue, for 
high and low probability of upcoming shock, respectively. At time of outcome, we entered 
four regressors, separating high expectation shock, high expectation no shock, low 
expectation shock, and low expectation no shock. Additionally, we entered four equivalent 
regressors at time of subjective rating period onset. In order to examine how amygdala 
responses at the actual time of rating relate to subjective anxiety ratings on a trial-by-trial 
basis, we used parametric modulators containing trial-by-trial ratings for each regressor, i.e., 
each condition separately. Hence, we assessed the relationship between amygdala activity 
and subjective reports irrespective of the condition that subjects were in. 
 Note that first-level regressors were modelled as events, i.e., 0sec duration, and 
convolved with SPM’s canonical hemodynamic response function as in previous studies 
assessing amygdala activity in event-related designs (e.g., 15, 26, 33). We regressed out 
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movement-related variance using six head motion parameters as assessed by the realignment 
algorithm. Each run was modelled as separate session to account for offset differences in 
signal intensity. 
To assess activity in amygdala subregions we used cytoarchitectonically demarcated 
probabilistic maps, focusing specifically on centromedial (CMA; central and medial nuclei) 
and basolateral (BLA; lateral, basolateral, basomedial, and paralaminar nuclei) nuclear 
groups (34). Masks were created via the SPM anatomy toolbox, i.e., cytoarchtectonically 
defined by using maximum probability maps, representing summary maps of different 
probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps (34, 35). One of the advantages of these maps is that 
they allow the definition of a continuous volume for a subregion without any overlap with 
other subregions. Another advantage is that the procedure accords with existing fMRI studies 
on human amygdala subspecialisation using similar methods (e.g., 15, 33, 36, 37). We refer 
to this parcellation as CMA and BLA masks in the results section (cf. Supplementary Fig. 2 
for detailed visualisation of the masks). 
To demonstrate the robustness of task-activated amygdala responses without the 
restrictions of a parcellation approach, we also used a bilateral anatomical mask for the entire 
amygdala from the WFU PickAtlas toolbox in SPM, defined by using the Automated 
Anatomical Labelling (AAL) atlas. We refer to this independent mask as ‘entire amygdala’ in 
the results section. To correct for multiple comparisons, we used a family-wise error (FWE) 
rate threshold of p<0.05, small volume corrected for predefined bilateral regions of interest 
(uncorrected height threshold p<0.001). Figures of whole-brain maps at the respective height 
threshold are presented in Supplementary Fig. 6. Additionally, we report activations 
surviving at p<0.05 FWE-corrected for the whole brain. Activations are reported using x, y, z 
coordinates in MNI-space. 
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Results 
 
Retrospective anxiety as function of actual threat and experienced outcomes 
 To assess how objective threat is transformed into the subjective experience of 
anxiety, we asked subjects to report how anxious they felt during predictive cue presentation, 
i.e., before outcomes were revealed. Importantly, we probed subjects after outcome delivery 
by specifically asking for a subjective judgement about feelings at cue presentation. As per 
instruction, these self-reports should not be influenced by actual outcomes. We ran an 
ANOVA with factors ‘expectation’ (high/low) and ‘outcome’ (shock/no shock). This 
revealed significant main effects of ‘expectation’ [F(1,38)=103.505, p<0.001] and ‘outcome’ 
[F(1,38)=24.430, p<0.001], with no interaction [F(1,38)=2.153, p=0.151]. An additional trial-
by-trial linear regression model confirmed these results whilst additionally showing no effect 
of outcome history, elapsed time since outcome receipt, or time taken to report 
(Supplementary Fig. 3). Importantly, a separate analysis of the 1st and 2nd half of the 
experiment indicated that anxiety ratings were remarkably stable across halves 
(Supplementary Fig. 1). Findings indicate anxiety ratings were strongly influenced by both 
objective threat level, i.e., greater for high vs. low expectation of upcoming shock, and biased 
by experienced outcomes, i.e., greater for shock vs. no shock trials. Thus, subjects not only 
dissociated between objectively different threat levels at cue, but their subjective reports of 
anxiety were distorted by a recent receipt of an aversive outcome.  
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Threat dissociation during aversive anticipation in BLA 
 To investigate how amygdala subregions responded to objective threat we used a 
voxel-based analysis, comparing cue-elicited responses signalling high vs. low probability of 
upcoming shocks. The BLA showed a significant dissociation for threat levels, with a 
significantly enhanced response to high compared to low shock probability cues (Fig. 2A; [29 
3 -24], t(38)=4.47,  PFWE=0.018 BLA, PFWE=0.028 entire amygdala). A control analysis using 
a finite impulse response set showed a remarkably similar result (Supplementary Figure 4), 
confirming that BLA threat response was accurately modelled using a canonical 
hemodynamic response function. We did not find such threat level modulation in CMA (even 
at an uncorrected height threshold of p<0.001), suggesting a functional dissociation with only 
BLA processing threat. 
To formally assess a dissociation in responsivity across subregions, we compared 
mean activation at cue for both subregions. For this analysis, we extracted average beta 
values across all voxels within bilateral anatomical masks. A rm-ANOVA, with factors 
‘subregion’ (BLA/CMA), ‘expectation’ (high/low), showed no effect of subregion 
[F(1,38)=0.094, p=0.760], a statistical trend for expectation [F(1,38)=3.209, p=0.081], and a 
trend-level interaction [F(1,38)=3.379, p=0.074]. Follow-up t-tests showed BLA responses 
were greater for high as compared to low probability of upcoming shock (t(38)=2.504, 
p=0.017), whilst no such effect evident in CMA (t(38)=0.932, p=0.357; Fig. 2B). These 
results suggest the BLA shows a modulation in response across threat levels during 
anticipation of aversive outcomes. 
 
Dissociable response in BLA and CMA to aversive outcomes 
 13
The amygdala represents aversive outcomes, and these responses are thought to be 
modulated by expectation (15, 38). Thus, we asked how BLA and CMA respond to aversive 
events and whether there was a modulation by expectation related to these same events. We 
first compared activity for shock versus no shock outcomes, irrespective of prior expectation. 
A voxel-based analysis revealed significant activation in the amygdala, with bilateral peaks 
centred on CMA (Fig. 3A; [-20 -6 -12], t(38)=7.20 & [26 -9 -12], t(38)=7.07, PFWE<0.001 
CMA, PFWE<0.001 entire amygdala). Significant shock responses were also found in bilateral 
BLA ([26 3 -21], t(38)=5.83, PFWE<0.001 BLA; [-24 -2 -20], t(38)=4.79, PFWE=0.007 BLA). 
Extending this analysis to the whole brain, we found areas encompassing a so-called ‘pain 
matrix’ responding more to shocks than no shock conditions (Supplementary Fig. 5 & Table 
3; including bilateral insula, adjacent somatosensory cortex, medial/anterior cingulate cortex, 
periaqueductal gray, thalamus, and amygdala; p<0.05 whole-brain FWE-corrected). To assess 
whether head motion could account for neural shock signals, we assessed framewise 
displacement (FD) during our task. Here, the comparison of FD for shock vs. no shock period 
showed no difference (1 volume post outcome onset: p=0.581, 3 volumes: p=0.206, 5 
volumes: p=0.400). Thus, head movements during shock delivery did not account for these 
findings. 
 Next, we assessed whether expectation modulated outcome processing. We found an 
expectation effect on BLA responses to outcomes (Fig. 3B; [-26 -2 -30], t(38)=4.44, 
PFWE=0.020 BLA, PFWE=0.016 entire amygdala), with greater activation for low versus high 
expectation trials. Such an expectation-induced effect was not evident in CMA. This suggests 
while both subregions respond to shock, the BLA alone encodes an expectation of shock 
outcomes. 
To assess this functional dissociation more formally, we examined mean activation 
for all four outcome types within bilateral anatomical masks (Fig. 3C&D). A rm-ANOVA 
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with factors ‘subregion’ (BLA/CMA), ‘expectation’ (high/low), ‘outcome’ (shock/no shock) 
showed an effect of subregion [F(1,38)=5.614, p=0.023] and outcome [F(1,38)=24.652, 
p<0.001], but no effect of expectation [F(1,38)=2.182, p=0.148]. We identified a significant 
interaction between subregion and expectation [F(1,38)=10.082, p=0.003], and between 
subregion and outcome [F(1,38)=43.206, p<0.001]. Post-hoc t-tests confirmed that whilst 
both subregions responded significantly to shock (BLA: t(38)=3.167, p=0.003; CMA: 
t(38)=5.965, p<0.001; Fig 3E), this response was significantly greater in CMA than BLA 
(t(38)=6.573, p<0.001). In contrast, BLA alone encoded expectation (BLA: t(38)=3.169, 
p=0.003; CMA: t(38)=-0.144 p=0.886; Fig. 3E), indicated by a significant interaction 
between subregion and expectation, reflecting an effect greater for BLA than CMA 
(t(38)=3.175, p=0.003). There was no significant three-way interaction [F(1,38)=0.003, 
p=0.956], indicative of the two-way interactions representing two separate effects. 
 Overall, the profile of BLA response fulfilled requirements for a signed aversive 
prediction error (39), with enhanced response for less compared to highly predicted aversive 
events (t(38)=2.343, p=0.024), and an attenuated response for less as compared to a highly 
predicted aversive event omission (t(38)=2.232, p=0.032; Fig. 3D). 
 
Amygdala activity and subjective aversive experience 
 As highlighted above, retrospective reports of cue-elicited anxiety were influenced by 
both objective threat level at cue and by outcomes (Fig. 4A). Consequently, we asked how 
amygdala activity in response to threat and aversive outcomes related to reports of aversive 
experience. Firstly, we examined whether the neural dissociation between threat levels in 
BLA at cue related to a corresponding effect of expectation on self-reported anxiety. We 
found that threat-related modulation of BLA activity (high vs. low objective probability of 
upcoming shock) correlated with an equivalent dissociation of threat levels in subjective 
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reports (high vs. low objective probability of shock, peak voxel activity; Fig. 4B; r=0.373, 
p=0.020). Notably, this relationship remained significant when controlling for CMA activity 
(r=0.357, p=0.028). However, there was no such relationship for CMA activity alone 
(r=0.113, p=0.491). This indicates that greater threat-related modulation of BLA activity is 
mirrored in a behavioural dissociation of threat-induced subjective anxiety across 
participants. 
 Next, we assessed whether shock effects at outcome as observed in both BLA and 
CMA related to corresponding distorting outcome effects on retrospective anxiety reports. 
We found no significant relationship (shock vs. no shock, peak voxel activity: CMA: 
r=0.076, p=0.645; BLA: r=0.101, p=0.542), indicating no systematic impact of amygdala 
shock responses and subjective reports across participants. 
 Finally, we tested whether amygdala responses at the actual time of rating, i.e., when 
aversive experience was retrospectively constructed related to how anxious subjects reported 
to have felt. Importantly, we here used a separate parametric modulator for each of the four 
conditions at rating period onset. Thus, we regressed out main effects of cues and outcomes 
so as to control for the known impact of expectation and shock, assessing the relationship 
between amygdala activity and subjective reports irrespective of the condition that subjects 
were in. CMA activity positively correlated with subjective anxiety reports (Fig. 4C; [-23 -6 -
12], t(38)=4.14, PFWE=0.011 CMA, PFWE=0.032 entire amygdala). There was no such effect 
in BLA. A rm-ANOVA with factors ‘subregion’ (BLA/CMA), ‘expectation’ (high/low), 
‘outcome’ (shock/no shock) to confirm a functional subspecialisation showed an effect of 
subregion [F(1,38)=6.700, p=0.014] and a significant subregion outcome interaction 
[F(1,38)=8.068, p=0.007]. Follow-up t-tests confirmed a significant effect in CMA 
(t(38)=2.232, p=0.032), but not BLA (t(38)=0.512, p=0.611, Supplementary Fig. 7). 
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Moreover, the effect was significantly greater in CMA than BLA (t(38)=2.588, p=0.014), 
particularly after shock as compared to no shock outcomes (t(38)=2.841, p=0.007). 
This suggests post-shock CMA activity when making retrospective anxiety reports, 
i.e., after outcomes were revealed, biased the recollected subjective experience of previous 
anticipatory aversive states. 
 
Threat signals in BLA relate to trait anxiety 
 Previous research has reported amygdala hyperactivity in highly anxious individuals 
across a range of experimental paradigms (40-42). However, the exact relationship between 
amygdala responses to threat and trait anxiety remains unclear. One hypothesis proposes 
anxious individuals do not regulate amygdala responses to variable levels of threat, thus 
exhibiting indiscriminately heightened amygdala activation (43-45). 
To specifically test this hypothesis, we correlated a BLA response that encoded 
objectively different threat levels with trait anxiety scores. We found that a greater neural 
dissociation between cue-elicited BLA responses (high vs. low probability of upcoming 
shock, peak voxel activity) was significantly associated with lower trait anxiety (Fig. 5B; r=-
0.322, p=0.045). Notably, this relationship remained significant when controlling for CMA 
activity (r=-0.383, p=0.018). However, there was no such relationship for CMA activity 
alone (r=0.112, p=0.492). This finding supports the notion that trait-anxious individuals are 
characterized by a reduced discriminatory response to different threat levels in the BLA. 
An impaired threat modulation of BLA activity could arise for two reasons. Anxious 
individuals might fail to activate BLA in response to highly threatening stimuli, or they might 
display elevated BLA responses to any threatening stimulus, irrespective of its objective 
threat level. To arbitrate between these explanations, we correlated a BLA response to 
aversive cues irrespective of threat level (collapsed across high and low probability trials, 
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peak voxel activity) with individual trait anxiety scores. We found a significant positive 
correlation, i.e., a greater overall cue-elicited BLA response was associated with greater trait 
anxiety (Fig. 5A; r=0.328, p=0.041). Indeed, there was a positive relationship when testing 
for low and high threat cues separately (Supplementary Fig. 8). This is in keeping with the 
idea that highly anxious individuals show heightened BLA activity for aversive cues 
irrespective of their objective predictability. This suggests trait anxiety is associated with an 
elevated and undifferentiated threat response in BLA. 
 
 
 
Sex differences 
 The human amygdala is thought to be a sexually dimorphic area (46), and anxiety 
disorders are more prevalent in women than men (47). Thus, we assessed potential sex 
differences across our sample of female (n=22) and male (n=17) participants. 
Importantly, our sample was matched with regard to age (female: mean 24.5 ± 5.3, 
male: mean 25.6 ± 5.4; p=0.532) and trait anxiety (female: mean 35.9 ± 7.1, male: mean 34.6 
± 10.7; p=0.647). However, additional analyses (Supplementary Fig. 9) showed that the 
discrimination for high and low levels of threat in BLA was significantly stronger in females 
as compared to male participants (t(38)=2.696, p=0.010). Strikingly, this neural dissociation 
between threat levels showed a highly significant relationship to both subjective anxiety 
reports during the task (r=0.552, p=0.008) and trait anxiety (r=-0.503, p=0.017) in females, 
but not male participants (r=-0.082, p=0.753 & r=-0.290, p=0.259). We found no such gender 
differences for outcome processing or any other comparison of our main results. 
This suggest that BLA responsivity to varying levels of threat was particularly 
pronounced in female individuals, where greater dissociation between high and low levels of 
 18
threat in BLA was related to greater threat-related dissociation of cues in subjective ratings 
and lower levels of trait anxiety. 
 
 
Discussion 
 We show amygdala subregions, BLA and CMA, are distinctly engaged in processing 
of aversive experience. Specifically, BLA is engaged by aversive expectations, where a 
dissociation across threat levels is mirrored by reported subjective anxiety. Importantly, BLA 
activity relates to trait anxiety, with more anxious subjects showing elevated and 
undifferentiated responses to threat, an effect particularly pronounced in female individuals. 
Conversely, CMA responds to aversive outcomes, but is insensitive to aversive cues or their 
associated expectations. 
In many human neuroimaging studies participants are confronted with cues that vary 
not only in predictability (probability of shock), but also uncertainty (absolute deviation from 
probability of shock equal to 50%) about upcoming aversive events. For example, previous 
studies often compared a partially reinforced aversive schedule to stimuli predicting complete 
safety (e.g., 47-51). This type of design renders it difficult to disentangle effects of 
predictiveness and uncertainty. Our task allowed us to control for uncertainty and in doing so 
shows that amygdala subregions play distinct roles in response to predictive stimuli. Most 
striking here is the observation that BLA activity scales with increasing levels of threat. 
The BLA is anatomically well-placed for processing environmental information about 
potential threat as it receives dense connections from the thalamus and sensory association 
cortices (37, 52-54). Our findings complement previous accounts of the role of the BLA in 
learning about threat, demonstrating the BLA is important in detecting variable threat and 
predicting the occurrence of negative outcomes (15, 19, 20). 
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Activation in the amygdala to shock was primarily signalled in CMA, highlighting its 
role in processing acutely imminent threat and pain (22-24). However, in contrast to the 
CMA, responses to aversive outcomes in the BLA were modulated by expectation, with 
enhanced activation for less predicted aversive events. This accords with prior neuroimaging 
studies showing unconditioned response diminution, i.e., reduced responses for expected 
versus unexpected aversive unconditioned stimuli, in the human amygdala (55,56). 
Importantly, the BLA also displayed a greater attenuation in responsiveness for less predicted 
shock omission. Thus, responses at outcome to both aversive events and omission of such 
events in the BLA have the characteristics of a signed aversive prediction error (39). Such 
aversive predictions errors are known to play a crucial role in learning from aversive 
reinforcers such as pain (15, 57, 58). This finding extends on previous studies which have 
shown the expression of amygdala prediction errors (27, 59) by demonstrating an anatomical 
specificity to this effect, an observation that is in accord with a similar finding in rodents (60, 
61). 
Consistent with prior evidence that the amygdala supports interoceptive emotional 
awareness (21, 62, 63), we found distinct relations of BLA and CMA with subjective 
experience. A greater neural dissociation within the BLA for threat levels was linked to a 
threat-related dissociation in reported subjective anxiety across individuals. Intriguingly, 
fluctuations in CMA activity at time of reporting were linked to subjective experience about 
previous anxiety states on a trial-by-trial basis. This indicates that retrospective reports about 
past aversive states are subject to an influence from current representation of outcomes in 
CMA. This finding aligns with the role of the CMA as the major output centre of the 
amygdala, in generating behavioural responses to acute stressors (22-24). 
An elevated BLA response to aversive cues in highly anxious individuals is consistent 
with prior neuroimaging findings that suggest a relationship between anxiety and amygdala 
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hyperactivity (64-68). Importantly, anxious subjects showed a lack of discrimination for 
variable threat levels in BLA, despite aversive cues being highly predictive. Interestingly, 
additional analyses showed that the association between greater trait anxiety and blunted 
threat discrimination in BLA was particularly pronounced in female individuals. 
This finding demonstrates that trait-anxious individuals display a failure to regulate 
BLA activity adequately in response to objectively different threat levels, supporting the 
notion that anxiety is associated with elevated and undifferentiated amygdala activity, 
potentially due to a failure to adequately modulate its responses to objective features of the 
environment (43-45). 
This link between a lack of discrimination of BLA responses and trait anxiety also 
concurs with previous work suggesting trait-anxious individuals do not accurately adjust 
expectations to reflect changes in environmental contingencies during aversive learning (69, 
70). Such a failure to regulate BLA responses might in turn lead to an internal state of 
uncertainty about threat despite objectively predictable conditions, and to increases in anxiety 
symptomatology (45, 71). Overall, our findings complement previous studies indicating 
aberrant threat processing in amygdala putatively playing a role in the onset, or maintenance 
of anxiety-related disorders (67, 68, 72). 
 
Limitations 
 Firstly, our study provides multiple layers of evidence for the involvement of BLA 
but not CMA in responding to threat. However, in contrast to a strong dissociation between 
subregions for outcome processing, the comparison between subregions for aversive cues 
only showed a statistical trend. Thus, an involvement of CMA in processing of varying levels 
of threat cannot be fully ruled out. A second limitation of our study is the limited size and 
scope of the present sample. Although the observed relations between amygdala activity and 
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trait anxiety are consistent with prior work (43-45), future studies are needed to assess the 
reproducibility of these discoveries in larger samples (73, 74). Likewise, it will be fruitful to 
examine whether these relations extend to individuals with more extreme levels of trait 
anxiety and to patients meeting diagnostic criteria for anxiety disorder (2). 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, we show a functional dissociation within the human amygdala in 
relation to aversive processing. The CMA responds to aversive outcomes, while the BLA 
represents aversive events and expectations about those events. Moreover, BLA activity 
scales with increasing levels of threat, with more anxious individuals showing poorer 
discrimination across distinct threat levels. Our findings provide insight into how human 
amygdala subregions contribute to subjective anxiety, where an encoding of threat within 
BLA emerges as a potential neurobiological mediator of vulnerability to anxiety disorders. 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. Experimental task. 
At cue presentation, one of two insects (mosquito / bug) appeared next to a hand indexed an 
objective probability, learned before the scanning session, of an upcoming electrical shock. 
One insect indicated a high probability, and one insect indicated a low probability of 
receiving a shock. At outcome, an appearance of a red dot superimposed on the hand 
indicated receipt of concurrent shock. By contrast, a red dot next to the hand indicated no 
shock. Following a jittered fixation, subjects were asked to report how anxious they 
remembered feeling during cue presentations, i.e., whilst the insect had been present. After 
another jittered fixation, one of the two insects appeared again to indicate the beginning of 
the next trial. 
 
 
Figure 2. Amygdala responses to different levels of threat at cue presentation 
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(A) Greater BLA activity at time of cue presentation was associated with enhanced objective 
threat levels, i.e., high vs. low probability of upcoming shock. 
(B) Trend-level interaction between ‘subregion’ and ‘expectation’ at cue, with significant 
threat modulation (high vs. low probability of upcoming shock) in BLA, and no effect in 
CMA. Mean betas for bilateral BLA and CMA masks. * p<0.05, (*) p=0.074, n.s. = not 
significant, a.u. = arbitrary units, error bars indicate SEM. Neural results are presented as 
SPM activation maps overlaid on a default structural brain in MRIcron (75). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Dissociation between BLA and CMA in response to aversive events 
(A) Shock vs. no shock outcomes are associated with increased outcome-related activity in 
the CMA. 
(B) Low vs. high expectation cue are associated with increased activity in the BLA at the 
time of outcomes, contrasting with expectation-related modulation at the time of cue 
presentation. 
(C) Response to all four outcome types in CMA: Activity in CMA represents aversive events, 
which are not modulated by expectations. Mean betas for bilateral CMA mask. High & Low 
= high and low probability of shock. 
(D) Response to all four outcome types in BLA. Activity in BLA represents an aversive 
prediction error that depends on both aversive events and expectations about those events. 
Stronger activation for less predicted (low probability of shock) as compared to highly 
predicted (high probability of shock) aversive events. Stronger attenuation of responses for 
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less predicted (high probability of shock) as compared to highly predicted (low probability of 
shock) omission of aversive events. Mean betas for bilateral BLA mask. High & Low = high 
and low probability of shock. 
(E) Significant interaction between subregion and outcome as indicated by greater shock 
responses in CMA than BLA. Significant interaction between subregion and expectation as 
indicated by significant effect of expectation in BLA, and no effect in CMA. Mean betas for 
bilateral BLA and CMA masks. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, n.s. = not significant, a.u. 
= arbitrary units, error bars indicate SEM. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Amygdala activity and subjective aversive experience 
(A) Subjective reports of remembered anticipatory anxiety at cue presentation. Anxiety 
ratings were influenced by both objective threat level in the cue period, i.e., greater for high 
vs. low expectation of upcoming shock, and were also biased by experienced outcomes, i.e., 
greater for shock vs. no shock trials, error bars indicate SEM. 
(B) A greater neural difference between cue-elicited BLA responses (high vs. low probability 
of upcoming shock) was linked to a greater dissociation between threat levels in anxiety 
ratings (high vs. low probability of shock). * p<0.05, a.u. = arbitrary units. 
(C) Positive correlation between trial-by-trial variability in CMA activity at time of reporting 
on a visual analogue scale and retrospective reports of subjective anxiety at cue presentation.  
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Figure 5. Threat signals in BLA and trait anxiety 
(A) A greater overall cue-related BLA response (high and low probability of upcoming 
shock) was associated with greater trait anxiety. 
(B) A greater neural difference between cue-related BLA responses (high vs. low probability 
of upcoming shock) was associated with lower trait anxiety. * p<0.05, a.u. = arbitrary units. 
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Supplementary Figure S1. Anxiety ratings for pre-fMRI training and 1st and 2nd half of the fMRI experiment. 
Subjective reports of remembered anticipatory anxiety at cue presentation. Anxiety ratings were influenced 
by both objective threat level in the cue period, i.e., greater for high vs. low expectation of upcoming shock, 
and were also biased by experienced outcomes, i.e., greater for shock vs. no shock trials. Error bars indicate 
SEM. 
(A) Subjects had already learned to dissociate between two threat levels during training, as indicated by strong 
main effect of ‘expectation’ (high vs. low probability) [F(1,38)=74.730, p<0.001]. Similar to the main 
experiment, we also found a significant main effect of ‘outcome’ (shock vs. no shock) [F(1,38)=23.621, 
p<0.001], with no interaction [F(1,38)=0.064, p=0.802]. 
(B) & (C) Similar results were found when splitting the fMRI experiment in two separate halves: 
1st half: ‘expectation’ (high vs. low probability): [F(1,38)=109.074, p<0.001], ‘outcome’ (shock vs. no shock): 
[F(1,38)=23.828, p<0.001], interaction: [F(1,38)=2.499, p=0.122]. 
2nd half: ‘expectation’ (high vs. low probability): [F(1,38)=73.052, p<0.001], ‘outcome’ (shock vs. no shock): 
[F(1,38)=15.149, p<0.001], interaction: [F(1,38)=0.311, p=0.588]. 
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 Entire 
Amygdala 
  BLA     CMA      BLA 
vs CMA 
 voxel   voxel   mask  voxel   mask   mask 
 [x y z] T= PFWE= [x y z] T= PFWE= beta= P= [x y z] T= P= beta= P=  P= 
Cue                
Expectation                
6mm 29 2 -23 4.17 0.028 29 3 -24 4.47 0.018 0.986 0.017 - - - 0.416 0.357  0.074 
4.5mm 29 2 -21 4.30 0.024 29 3 -24 4.38 0.027 1.000 0.019 - - - 0.384 0.426  0.088 
3mm 27 2 -20 4.54 0.019 27 2 -21 4.09 0.080 0.939 0.029 - - - 0.370 0.456  0.156 
Outcome                
Shock                
6mm 26 -9 -12 8.28 <0.001 26 3 -21 5.83 <0.001 3.441 0.003 26 -9 -12 7.07 <0.001 8.662 <0.001  <0.001 
 -20 -6 -12 7.20 <0.001 -24 -2 -20 4.79 0.007   -20 -6 -12 7.20 <0.001     
4.5mm 26 -9 -12 8.38 <0.001 26 3 -20 5.32 0.002 3.044 0.009 26 -8 -12 6.87 <0.001 9.222 <0.001  <0.001 
 -24 -8 -12 6.80 <0.001 -24 -2 -20 4.69 0.011   -24 -8 -12 6.80 <0.001     
3mm 26 -9 -12 7.80 <0.001 24 3 -18 4.82 0.012 2.902 0.011 26 -6 -12 5.98 <0.001 9.790 <0.001  <0.001 
 -26 -8 -12 7.15 <0.001 -24 -2 -20 4.52 0.026   -26 -9 -12 6.33 <0.001     
Expectation                
6mm -27 -2 -26 4.41 0.016 -26 -2 -30 4.44 0.020 2.402 0.003 - - - -0.138 0.886  0.003 
4.5mm -26 -3 -29 3.78 0.086 -26 0 -32 4.06 0.060 2.475 0.002 - - - -0.276 0.796  0.005 
3mm 30 -2 -24 3.86 0.102 -27 -5 -26 4.09 0.081 2.593 0.001 - - - -0.335 0.779  0.009 
VAS                
Self-reports                
6mm -23 -6 -12 4.14 0.032 - - - 0.918 0.611 -23 -6 -12 4.14 0.011 4.125 0.032  0.014 
4.5mm -24 -5 -12 4.03 0.050 - - - 0.854 0.642 -24 -5 -14 3.94 0.021 4.237 0.047  0.021 
3mm -24 -5 -12 3.95 0.088 - - - 0.821 0.660 -24 -5 -14 3.86 0.034 4.223 0.078  0.045 
Supplementary Table S1. Main results for different smoothing kernels 
The main results reported in the manuscript (6mm smoothing kernel), as assessed with 4.5mm and 3mm smoothing kernels, respectively. Results are shown at 
the voxel-level (x, y, z coordinates in MNI-space), FWE-corrected for the respective bilateral mask, and for mean activation across the bilateral masks. 
Cue Expectation: Activity at time of cue presentation for high vs. low probability of upcoming shock., Outcome Shock: Activity at time of outcome presentation 
for shock vs. no shock., Outcome Expectation: Activity at time of outcome presentation for low vs. high probability of shock., VAS Self-reports: Positive 
correlation between trial-by-trial activity at time of reporting and retrospective reports of subjective anxiety at cue presentation. 
Entire amygdala = Independent bilateral amygdala mask from WFU PickAtlas toolbox, defined using the Automated Anatomical Labelling (AAL), CMA = 
Bilateral centromedial amygdala mask, BLA = Bilateral basolateral amygdala mask. 
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 Entire 
Amygdala 
    BLA    CMA    
 [x y z] T= PFWE= % BLA % CMA [x y z] T= PFWE= % BLA [x y z] T= PFWE= % CMA 
Cue              
Expectation 29 2 -23 4.17 0.028 37 [21-58] 0 29 3 -24 4.47 0.018 37 [18-57] - - - - 
Outcome              
Shock 26 -9 -12 8.28 <0.001 0 19 [5-33] 26 3 -21 5.83 <0.001 40 [30-51] 26 -9 -12 7.07 <0.001 19 [5-33] 
 -20 -6 -12 7.20 <0.001 0 36 [14-42] -24 -2 -20 4.79 0.007 33 [23-55] -20 -6 -12 7.20 <0.001 36 [14-42] 
Expectation -27 -2 -26 4.41 0.016 91 [58-94] 0 -26 -2 -30 4.44 0.020 85 [64-90] - - - - 
VAS              
Self-reports -23 -6 -12 4.14 0.032 0 31 [12-39] - - - - -23 -6 -12 4.14 0.011 31 [12-39] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table S2. Peak voxel statistics and cytoarchitectonic probabilities 
Results are shown at the voxel-level (x, y, z coordinates in MNI-space), p-values represent FWE-corrected statistics for the respective bilateral mask. Probabilities 
are computed from maximum probability maps, i.e., summary maps of different probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps as implemented in the SPM anatomy 
toolbox. 
Cue Expectation: Activity at time of cue presentation for high vs. low probability of upcoming shock., Outcome Shock: Activity at time of outcome presentation 
for shock vs. no shock., Outcome Expectation: Activity at time of outcome presentation for low vs. high probability of shock., VAS Self-reports: Positive 
correlation between trial-by-trial activity at time of reporting and retrospective reports of subjective anxiety at cue presentation. 
Entire amygdala = Independent bilateral amygdala mask from WFU PickAtlas toolbox, defined using the Automated Anatomical Labelling (AAL), CMA = 
Bilateral centromedial amygdala mask, BLA = Bilateral basolateral amygdala mask. 
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Supplementary Figure S2. Visualisation of the ROIs superimposed on the mean normalized structural image. 
CMA: Centromedial amygdala & BLA: Basolateral amygdala as derived from the SPM anatomy toolbox. 
AAL: Independent entire amygdala mask from WFU PickAtlas toolbox, defined using the Automated 
Anatomical Labelling (AAL) atlas. x, y, z coordinates in MNI-space. 
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Supplementary Figure S3. Trial-by-trial regression model of subjective anxiety ratings. 
To predict anxiety ratings on current trial T, we used (i) probability (high vs. low), (ii) outcome type (shock 
vs. no shock), and (iii) interaction term of the current trial T, whilst also testing for influence of (iv) elapsed 
time since outcome receipt (Time US-VAS), (v) time taken to report (Time VAS rating) and outcome type of 
previous trials, i.e., (vi) Trial T-1 and (vii) T-2. 
Results confirmed the average effects reported in the manuscript: 
Effect of probability (i): p<0.001; Effect of outcome (ii): p<0.001: Interaction n.s.: p=0.131, whilst 
additionally showing no effects of (iv): p=0.720, (v): p=0.331; (vi): p=0.074; (vii): p=0.091.  
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Supplementary Figure S4. Finite impulse response analysis. 
BOLD response to aversive cues was modelled with a finite impulse response set consisting of a number of 
successive post-stimulus time bins (“mini-boxcars”, 1.5s). Here, time represents post-stimulus onset time in 
seconds. This analysis revealed that BOLD response to threat, i.e., high vs. low probability at cue, showed a 
response pattern remarkably similar to a canonical HRF, with peak activity around 5-6s post-stimulus onset 
(as predicted by a canonical HRF). Note that this was true for both BLA peak voxel (informed from our 
conventional analysis, p<0.05) and mean activity averaged across the entire bilateral BLA mask. 
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Supplementary Figure S5. Whole-brain shock signals 
Contrast shock vs. no shock at outcome, PFWE<0.05, whole-brain, corrected at voxel level. 
x, y, z coordinates in MNI-space. 
Supplementary Figure S6. Whole-brain results at uncorrected height threshold, p<0.001. 
(A) Contrast high vs. low probability at cue. 
(B) Contrast low vs. high probability at outcome. 
(C) Positive correlation between trial-by-trial variability in activity at time of reporting on a visual analogue 
scale and retrospective reports of subjective anxiety at cue presentation. 
Note that these slices correspond to the respective masked amygdala results presented in the main manuscript. 
x, y, z coordinates in MNI-space. 
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Region [x y z] T= PFWE= 
    
Primary Sensory Cortex (SI) – Right 38 -15 18 12.72 <0.001 
Insula – Left -36 -18 17 12.46 <0.001 
Insula – Right 38 -2 -8 11.64 <0.001 
Secondary Sensory Cortex (SII) – Right 56 -17 14 10.43 <0.001 
Secondary Sensory Cortex (SII) – Left -59 -26 24 9.11 <0.001 
Precuneus – Left -6 -69 33 8.94 <0.001 
Periaqueductal Gray (PAG) – Left -8 -27 -8 8.83 <0.001 
Periaqueductal Gray (PAG) – Right 6 -30 -15 8.45 <0.001 
Primary Sensory Cortex (SI) – Left -47 -21 23 8.42 <0.001 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex (PCC) – Left -6 -21 30 8.32 <0.001 
Thalamus – Right 8 -5 8 8.31 <0.001 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) – Left -27 35 -14 7.83 0.001 
Visual Cortex – Right 15 -72 11 7.83 0.001 
Cerebellum – Right 6 -56 -35 7.73 0.001 
Insula – Right -35 23 12 7.64 0.002 
Cerebellum – Right 2 -74 -15 7.62 0.002 
Thalamus – Left -14 -17 5 7.38 0.004 
Middle Cingulate Cortex (MCC) – Right 5 18 35 7.28 0.006 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex (PCC) – Left -5 -41 41 7.25 0.006 
Cerebellum – Left -39 -54 -30 7.22 0.007 
Centromedial Amygdala (CMA) – Left -20 -6 -12 7.20 0.007 
Visual Cortex – Left -3 -83 6 7.17 0.008 
Centromedial Amygdala (CMA) – Right 26 -9 -12 7.07 0.012 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) – Left -5 18 30 7.05 0.012 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) – Right 33 32 5 6.53 0.048 
Supplementary Table S3. Whole-brain shock signals (corresponding to Supplementary Fig. 4) 
Local maxima derived from the contrast shock vs. no shock at outcome. 
PFWE<0.05, whole-brain, corrected at voxel level. 
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Supplementary Figure S7. Relationship between activity at time of reporting and subjective anxiety. 
Mean betas for bilateral BLA and CMA masks for positive correlation between trial-by-trial-variability in 
activity and retrospective anxiety reports. * p<0.05, n.s. = not significant, a.u. = arbitrary units, error bars 
indicate SEM. 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S8. Threat signals in BLA and trait anxiety 
A greater cue-related BLA response to low (A) and (B) high levels of threat was associated with greater trait 
anxiety. 
* p<0.05, (*) p=0.064; a.u. = arbitrary units. 
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Supplementary Figure S9. Sex differences in BLA threat modulation. 
(A) BLA activity at time of cue presentation scaling with enhanced objective threat levels, i.e., high vs. low 
probability of upcoming shock was significantly greater in female than male participants. 
A greater neural difference between cue-elicited BLA responses (high vs. low probability of upcoming shock) 
was linked to a greater dissociation between threat levels in anxiety ratings (high vs. low probability of shock) 
in female (|B) but not in male participants (C). A greater neural difference between cue-related BLA responses 
(high vs. low probability of upcoming shock) was associated with lower trait anxiety in female (|D) but not in 
male participants (E). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, n.s. = not significant, a.u. = arbitrary units, error bars indicate 
SEM. 
 
 
                  
 
        
